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Abstract. We consider the optimization problem of a multi-resource, multi-unit
VCG auction that produces an optimal, i.e., non-approximated, social welfare.
We present an algorithm that solves this optimization problem with pseudo-polynomial
complexity and demonstrate its efficiency via our implementation. Our imple-
mentation is efficient enough to be deployed in real systems to allocate com-
puting resources in fine time-granularity. Our algorithm has a pseudo-near-linear
time complexity on average (over all possible realistic inputs) with respect to the
number of clients and the number of possible unit allocations. In the worst case, it
is quadratic with respect to the number of possible allocations. Our experiments
validate our analysis and show near-linear complexity. This is in contrast to the
unbounded, nonpolynomial complexity of known solutions, which do not scale
well for a large number of agents.
For a single resource and concave valuations, our algorithm reproduces the results
of a well-known algorithm. It does so, however, without subjecting the valuations
to any restrictions and supports a multiple resource auction, which improves the
social welfare over a combination of single-resource auctions by a factor of 2.5-
50. This makes our algorithm applicable to real clients in a real system.
Keywords: VCG · MCMK · d-MCK · MCK · Resource Allocation · Cloud
1 Introduction
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers have been using auctions to control con-
gestion via preemptible virtual-machine (VM) instances for nearly a decade [3,5,7,47].
A natural extension of this idea is to auction additional individual resources in an exist-
ing VM. VCG auctions [13, 27, 55] are appealing for this purpose, as they are truthful:
they incentivize clients to reveal their true valuation of the resources, which helps cloud
providers accurately price their services. Moreover, VCG maximizes the social wel-
fare—the aggregate valuation the clients assign to the chosen resource allocation. For
private (corporate) cloud providers, maximizing the social welfare maximizes the ag-
gregate value the in-house clients generate for the corporation. Cloud clients compete
for multiple resources (e.g., RAM, CPU, bandwidth), and these need to be combined in
a single auction. A single resource VCG auction is computationally hard to solve [42],
and a multi-resource auction is more difficult.
Other solutions, besides auctions, were proposed for mitigating congestion. Posted
prices [35] and burstable performance [6, 14, 25, 43, 48] incentivize clients to reduce
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2 L. Funaro et al.
their requirements and hence reduce the congestion. Spot instances are based on the
uniform price auction [2]. VCG (or generally affine-maximizer) mechanisms, however,
are the only known truthful mechanisms that maximize social welfare [36, 50].
The optimization problem for a single-resource VCG auction can be reduced to
a multiple-choice knapsack problem (MCK), which is NP-hard but can be solved in
pseudo-polynomial time via dynamic programing [33]. Many approximated, sub-optimal
solutions have been proposed for the MCK problem [12, 37]. However, for VCG to be
truthful, an exact, optimal social welfare must be found [46]. To obtain a more effi-
cient, exact solution for a single resource VCG auction, researchers relax the problem
by requiring all the functions that describe client valuations of a resource allocation
(henceforth valuation functions) to be monotonically increasing and concave [38, 41]
or usually concave [3]. Others solve the problem for a single resource when only one
function is not concave but is monotonically increasing [9]. Concave valuation func-
tions are an unrealistic requirement for cloud clients as their valuation functions have
multiple inflection points [11, 20, 39, 56, 60, 62].
To auction multiple resources, we must consider the relationship between them.
Usually, computing resources are complementary goods: a client who is willing to pay
one dollar for an additional single unit of CPU time and RAM is unwilling to pay
anything for each resource individually. Alternatively, the resources might be substitute
goods: a client who is willing to pay one dollar for an additional single unit of each
resource is unwilling to pay two dollars for both resources together. Thus, in both cases,
the client cannot bid in an individual auction for each resource. If this client partitions
its budget between two resources, it may win only one or both. A client pays for a
worthless bundle if it wins only one of two complementary resources, or if it wins both
substitute resources. Such a scenario will also decrease the utilization. Only a multiple
resource auction that considers the clients’ value for each combination of resources can
both optimize the social welfare and be truthful.
Unfortunately, single resource solutions do not apply for multiple resources. The
multiple resource VCG auction can be reduced to a multiple-choice, multidimensional
knapsack problem (MCMK or d-MCK), which to the best of our knowledge has no
pseudo-polynomial solutions. Similarly to MCK, MCMK also has many approximated
solutions [4,21,29,34,44]. Such solutions provide near-optimal results: the best of them
yields results within 6% of the optimal value, which does not guarantee the auction will
be truthful and maximize the social welfare. Exact solutions for MCMK have been pro-
posed via branch-and-bound algorithms (B&B) [22,24,30,49,52]; however, their results
indicate an implicit nonpolynomial increase in runtime with respect to the number of
possible allocations. These solutions were only tested empirically with small datasets
and did not scale well for many clients and large, complete valuation functions.
Moreover, MCMK solutions were not designed for a VCG auction and thus do not
allow efficient calculation of payments according to the VCG payment rule. To compute
a winning client’s payment in a VCG auction, the auctioneer must find the social welfare
that could be achieved when that winning client is excluded from the auction. Solutions
not tailored to VCG must compute the payments by repeatedly finding the optimal
allocation for each winning client if that client had not participated in the auction. This
implies a worst-case quadratic complexity with respect to the number of clients.
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In this work, we implement an efficient, exact, multi-unit, multidimensional re-
source VCG auction. Two approaches can be considered for this problem. The resources
may be treated as infinitely divisible (continuous), as Lazar and Semret [38], Maille´ and
Tuffin [41], and Agmon Ben-Yehuda et al. [3] do for a single resource. The other ap-
proach, which we adopt, divides each resource into identical units of a predefined size
(e.g., a single CPU second can be time-shared as 1000 millisecond units). The smaller
the units are, the closer the auction’s result is to the continuous solution, and the higher
the complexity of finding the allocation that maximizes the social welfare.
In the multi-unit, multi-resource auction, agents, representing the clients, can bid
using a multidimensional valuation function, which attaches a monetary value to each
number of units of each resource. To find the exact solution, the auctioneer must con-
sider all the allocations for the number of agents and the number of resource units avail-
able. Since the number of possible divisions of resources between agents is exponential
in the number of agents and resource units, iterating over them is impractical.
We present a method for solving a multi-unit, multi-resource auction without any
restrictions on the valuation functions, in pseudo-near-linear time on average, over all
possible realistic valuation functions, with respect to the number of clients (n) and the
number of possible unit allocations for each client (N ). Our algorithm’s worst-case time
complexity is O(n · N2), as opposed to the worst-case nonpolynomial complexity of
the known MCMK algorithms. Furthermore, our algorithm computes the VCG auction
payments without repeating the full auction for each winning client. The payment cal-
culation complexity is a function of N and the number of winning clients. It does not
depend on the number of clients in the auction (n). Our solution is also applicable to a
single resource auction and has a better average complexity than the dynamic program-
ming solution, which is O(n ·N2) [33]. All of the above makes it feasible to choose a
VCG auction as a resource allocation mechanism in a real system.
Our contributions are an optimization algorithm for the multi-unit, multi-resource
allocation problem and an implementation of this algorithm with a choice of data struc-
tures to support it. We prove the correctness of the algorithm in Section 4 and numer-
ically analyze its complexity in Section 5. We evaluate the performance of our im-
plementation in Section 7 using each data structure and verify the correctness of the
results. We validate our results for a single resource with concave valuation functions,
by comparing to Maille´ and Tuffin’s results, and show that separate single-resource
auctions produce sub-optimal results, in contrast to multi-resource auctions, which pro-
duce optimal results. The implementation can be extended using other data structures.
We analyze the algorithm’s best possible performance independently of the choice of a
data structure.
2 The Non-Linear Optimization Problem
In this paper, vectorized arithmetic operators are defined element-wise. For example,
a+ b = (a0+ b0, ..., an+ bn), and a ≤ b⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ 1..R : ai ≤ bi. The symbols used
in this paper are listed in Table 1.
In an ideal VCG auction, the auctioneer computes the exact allocation that max-
imizes the social welfare. Each winning client pays the auctioneer according to the
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damage it caused the rest of the clients—i.e., the exclusion compensation principle.
This payment rule makes the auction truthful: the best client strategy is to bid with its
true valuation of the resources. Thus, VCG optimizes the social welfare according to
true data about client valuations.
The VCG optimization problem can be described as a non-linear optimization prob-
lem (NLP) that is separable, non-convex, and linearly and discretely constrained, as
follows:
Separable: The sum of n separable valuation functions is maximized.
Maximize:
n∑
i
Vi(ai). (1)
Such valuation functions can be represented as a multidimensional vector.
Non-Convex: None of the separable functions (Vi) are required to be convex, concave,
or even monotonic.
Linearly Constrained:
n∑
i=1
ai ≤m. (2)
Discretely Constrained: The resource is not continuous and is divided into units. Each
ai,r is a natural number (or zero) that represents the number of allocated units. Only
a whole unit can be allocated. Hence, the Vi functions should be defined only on an
even-spaced grid of the natural numbers.
3 Joint Valuation Algorithm
Funaro et al. [19] developed the joint valuation algorithm for finding the optimal allo-
cation of resources in a single dimension, for monotonically increasing functions with
O(n ·N2) time complexity. In this work, we extend this algorithm to multidimensional
non-monotonic valuation functions, such that it fulfills all the constraints delineated in
Section 2. While the complexity of a naı¨ve extension is proportional to the square of
the number of possible unit-allocation combinations, our extension has a pseudo-near-
linear complexity on average over all possible realistic valuation functions.
Weprove that the algorithm produces the correct optimal allocation and the correct
payments in Section 4, and numerically analyze its time complexity in Section 5.
Table 1: Table of symbols
n number of agents
R number of resources
m number of units for each resource: (m1, ...,mR)
ai allocation of agent i for each resource: (ai,1, ..., ai,R)
A set of allocations {ai}ni=1
Vi valuation function of agent i ∈ 1..n
N the number of possible allocations on which a valuation function is defined
N =
∏R
r=1 (mr + 1).
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3.1 Finding the Optimal Allocation
To find the optimal allocation, two agents are first combined into one effective agent
with a joint valuation function (Section 3.3). For any number and combination of goods
that the two agents will obtain together, the joint function stores the optimal division
of goods between them, and the sum of the valuations of these agents for this optimal
division. Then another agent is joined to the effective agent, and then another, etc. This
process produces a new joint valuation function at each stage, until the final effective
agent’s valuation function is the maximal aggregated valuation of all the agents. Its max-
imal value is the maximal social welfare. The optimal allocation is then reconstructed
from the stored division data of the joint valuation functions.
3.2 Payment Computation
Our algorithm is efficient in the number of times that the optimal allocation must be
computed. To compute a winning agent’s payment according to the exclusion compen-
sation principle, the auctioneer must determine the social welfare that could be achieved
when that winning agent is excluded from the auction. This can be naı¨vely computed by
repeatedly finding the optimal allocation for each winning agent, without its participa-
tion in the auction. Our algorithm, however, reduces the number of repetitions by using
a preliminary step. It re-computes the joint valuation function by joining the agents in
reverse order to that taken when first finding the optimal allocation. For each winning
agent j, the joint valuation function of the rest of the agents is computed by joining the
intermediate effective valuation function right before adding agent j, which includes
agents 1, .., j− 1, and the one right before adding j in the reverse order, which includes
agents j + 1, .., n. The maximal value of this function is the maximal social welfare
achievable without this agent, as required for the calculation of that agent’s payment
according to the exclusion compensation principle.
3.3 Joining Two Valuation Functions
To naı¨vely join two valuation functions, we need to find, for each possible allocation,
how to best divide the resources between the two clients. For each possible allocation
of the joint agents aj , there are
∏R
r=1 (aj,r + 1) possible divisions of the resource. To
compute the full joint valuation function of two clients, each with N possible alloca-
tions, the number of possible resource divisions to compare is∑
aj s.t.
aj≤m
(
R∏
r=1
(aj,r + 1)
)
=
R∏
r=1
mr(mr + 1)
2
= O(N2), (3)
for four resources, each with 15 units, N2 = 216. This number of comparisons will
take a few seconds to compute on a standard CPU for each joining of two valuation
functions. For many clients, however, this can add up to a full hour.
The complexity of finding the optimal allocation and the payments depends on the
complexity of joining two valuation functions. Let J(N) denote the complexity of join-
ing two valuation functions with N possible allocations. Then the algorithm’s time
complexity is O(n · J(N)).
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We can reduce the complexity of J(N) by reducing the number of compared allo-
cations. To do so, we filter out allocations that cannot maximize the social welfare. If
an allocation globally maximizes the social welfare, then (1) it is Pareto efficient: one
agent’s allocation cannot be improved without hindering another’s, and (2) it is also a
local optimum: the aggregated valuation cannot be increased by taking a resource from
one agent and giving it to another.
Formally, the Pareto efficiency property means that if the allocation is optimal, any
left partial derivative of any single agent’s valuation function is positive: ∂r−Vi(ai) >
0. The local optimum property means that for an optimal allocation, any right partial
derivative of any single agent’s valuation function is no greater than any of the other
agents’ left partial derivatives: ∂r+Vi(ai) ≤ ∂r−Vj(aj). Both are true element-wise
for each resource (r) dimension. Since our domain is discrete, partial derivatives are not
defined. We will define the left/right partial derivatives as the difference in the values
between adjacent points in the allocation space (dr = 1 for all the resources).
Using these properties, we restrict the search during the joining of two valuation
functions. We first eliminate client allocations in which the left partial derivative of
their valuation function in one of the resource dimensions is non-positive. Second, for
each possible allocation of the first valuation function, we only consider allocations of
the second function in which the condition on the partial derivative is maintained. To
accommodate boundary allocations (allocations that reside on the valuation function’s
domain boundary), where the left or right partial derivative is not well defined, we
assign the minimal allocation (zero) a left partial derivative of infinity, and assign the
maximal allocation (mr for each resource r) a right partial derivative of zero. We do
this because we cannot assign an agent with less than zero or more than the maximal
quantity.
These two restrictions will eliminate most of the resource divisions to O(N) com-
parisons instead of O(N2), as shown numerically in Section 5 and empirically in Sec-
tion 7. Algorithm 1 describes the joining of two valuation functions.
3.4 Upper-Bound Limit
Eliminating allocations that cannot be Pareto efficient (Lines 3 and 4 in Algorithm 1)
requires verifying a simple lower limit condition on the left partial derivative in the
initialization of the algorithm. The local optimum property (Line 6 in Algorithm 1),
however, requires repeated elimination for each loop iteration (Line 5 in Algorithm 1)
with different multi-dimensional conditions each time.
When joining two valuation functions of agents i and j, for each possible allocation
ai of agent i, we seek all the allocations aj of agent j for which the local optimum
property is maintained. Formally, we seek all aj such that:
∇+Vj(aj) ≤ ∇−Vi(ai) (4)
−∇−Vj(aj) ≤ −∇+Vi(ai) (5)
aj ≤m− ai (6)
Efficient Multi-Resource, Multi-Unit VCG Auction 7
Algorithm 1: Joining two valuation functions.
Data: Vi, Vj : valuation functions
Result: Vr: joint valuation function, Ar: the allocation that produces Vr
1 Initialize Vr and Ar to zeros;
2 Calculate Vi’s and Vj’s gradients and store them into an array of vectors;
3 Remove allocations such that ∂r−Vi(ai) ≤ 0 (for each r);
4 Remove allocations such that ∂r−Vj(aj) ≤ 0 (for each r);
5 foreach ai do
6 foreach aj such that for each r: ∂r+Vi(ai) ≤ ∂r−Vj(aj) and ∂r+Vj(aj) ≤ ∂r−Vi(ai)
and ai + aj ≤m do
7 vr ←− Vi(ai) + Vj(aj);
8 ar ←− ai + aj ;
9 if Vr(ar) < vr then
10 Vr(ar)←− vr;
11 Ar(ar)←− ai,aj ;
12 end
13 end
14 end
where we define
∇+Vi(ai) = (∂1+Vi(ai), ..., ∂R+Vi(ai)) (7)
∇−Vi(ai) = (∂1−Vi(ai), ..., ∂R−Vi(ai)) (8)
as the right and left gradients, respectively.
Each of these inequalities defines R upper-bound requirements on agent j’s allo-
cation, for a total of 3R requirements. For each of agent i’s possible allocations, we
need to efficiently find agent j’s allocations that match these requirements. To do so,
we preprocess agent j’s valuation function using a dedicated upper-bound data struc-
ture that allows efficient retrieval of allocations that match these requirements. We map
each possible allocation of agent j (aj) to a new 3R-dimensional vector:
(∇+Vj(aj),−∇−Vj(aj),aj) . (9)
We store these vectors in a k-dimensional upper-bound data structure, where k = 3R.
The data structure will contain a total of N vectors and thus its complexity will depend
on k and N . Then, for each possible allocation of agent i (ai), we query all the vectors
(defined in Equation 9) that are smaller than or equal to the following vector:
(∇−Vi(ai),−∇+Vi(ai),m− ai) . (10)
The k-dimensional upper-bound data structure must support the following methods:
– construct(all vectors): create the data structure.
– query(vector): find all the vectors that are smaller than or equal to a certain
vector (element-wise).
– fetch(): return all the vectors that match the last query.
We consider the k-dimensional (k-d) binary search trees that are listed in Table 2
along with their space and time complexities. The complexity of result fetching is linear
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with the number of returned vectors and not with the number of matching vectors,
because some data structures trade accuracy for efficiency, returning false positives.
Table 2: Upper-bound data structure comparison.
Complexity (O(...))
Data Structure Construct Query Space
k-d Tree [40] N logk−1N logk−1N N logk−1N
Simultaneous 1-d Bin. Searches kN logN k logN kN
Simultaneous 2-d Trees kN logN k logN kN logN
k-d Tree Algorithm 2 describes the construction of this tree.
Algorithm 2: k-d Tree Construction
Data: v: an array of N vectors
Result: a k-d Tree
1 call RecursiveBuild(1, N , v);
2 Function RecursiveBuild(d: sort dimension, M : array size, v: array of M vectors):
3 Sort the array of vectors (v) by dimension d;
4 if d ¡ k then
5 Create logM copies of the input array;
6 Partition each copied array t = 1.. logM into 2t−1 even parts;
7 foreach vi: array partition do
8 call RecursiveBuild(d+ 1, vi, vi size);
9 end
10 end
11 end
Figure 1 shows an example of a four-dimensional binary search tree. Each letter in
the example represents a four-dimensional vector. The initial array (d1) is sorted by the
first dimension. Each of the following blocks (d2, d3, d4) is built from a sorted array
created on the previous block. In this example, we partition the array up to partitions of
the size of two, as creating a sub-tree of one vector is not useful.
To query, we do a binary search by the first dimension on the first sorted array. Each
time the binary search continues to the upper half of the array—i.e., all the vectors in
the lower half are smaller in that dimension than the query—the vectors in the lower
half are filtered by the next dimension, by recursively running the query on the sub-tree
created from the lower half of the array. Then, the search continues to the upper half.
Finally, in the deepest sub-tree, we simply return all the vectors that are lower than the
position returned by the binary search. For example, starting from array d1 in Figure 1,
if the query is larger than vector h, the binary search will continue to the upper half of
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d1
d2
d4d3
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p
a b cd ef g h i jk lm no p
a b cd ef hi k lm no pj g
a b cde fhg
a b cde f hg bc h g
bch g
Fig. 1: Example of a four-dimensional binary search tree. Each letter represents a four-
dimensional vector. Each array in a rectangle marked with dX is sorted by dimension
X.
the array (i to p) and recursively run the query on the array with the bold frame in block
d2.
This data structure never returns false positives but has prohibitive time and space
complexity. For example, four resources require a 12-dimensional data structure with
O(N log11(N)) memory and time complexity. Even for a small N , e.g., N = 1024,
this can consume an entire machine. Thus, we did not test the performance of this data
structure. Following are more efficient methods that reduce the complexity by reducing
the accuracy of the results.
Simultaneous 1-d Binary Searches We store k arrays, each sorted according to an-
other dimension. For each upper-bound query, we perform a simultaneous binary search
on all the arrays. That is, instead of searching one array at a time, we perform each step
on all the sorted arrays simultaneously. In each step, some array searches continue to
the lower half and some to the upper half. We continue searching only with the array
searches that continue to the lower half. If all of the searches continue to the upper half,
we continue with all of them. When the search finishes, we have found the dimension
that filters the most vectors independently of the other dimensions. We will return all
the vectors that are lower than the position the search found. This is time and space
efficient, but yields many false positives, because we only filter by one dimension.
Simultaneous 2-d Trees A multidimensional binary search tree problem can be re-
laxed by constructing many two-dimensional binary search trees, each sorted according
to a different combination of two dimensions. Then, all of them can be queried, and the
vectors fetched from the tree whose query returned the least vectors.
To make the multiple queries more efficient, we use only a subset of the combina-
tions that we believe will filter the most vectors: all the combinations of two dimensions
that originate from the same resource r:
(∂r+Vi(ai),−∂r−Vi(ai), ai,r) . (11)
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We also construct the trees in a way that reduces the number of repeated queries: we first
build 3R arrays, each sorted by a different dimension. Then, from each array, we build
two trees, each for the other two dimensions that originated from the same resource.
Following this, an upper-bound query is implemented: (1) First, a simultaneous 1-d
binary search is performed on each sorted main dimension array. The partitions that had
to be searched when the binary search continued to the upper half are stored for later.
When the search is finished, the main dimension that found the lowest upper bound is
chosen (or one of them is chosen if more than one remained). (2) Next, each stored
partition is searched simultaneously in the two sub-trees of the chosen main dimension.
For each simultaneous search in the stored partition, we will return the results from the
one that yielded the fewest vectors.
The query, as described above, will require one simultaneous binary search on 3R
arrays, then at most logN simultaneous searches on two arrays. This results in consid-
erably fewer searches than when searching each combination of two dimensions indi-
vidually. Consequently, the time and space complexity of simultaneous 2-d trees are not
much higher than they are for simultaneous 1-d binary searches, but the former yields
considerably fewer false positives.
Combination Many of the vectors were created from a boundary allocation (having
maximal or zero allocation in one of the resources). Boundary allocations have a min-
imal partial derivative in the direction of the boundary; hence boundary allocations
are never filtered by the dimensions that correspond to the partial derivative in that
direction. We can classify vectors according to their boundary type (which domain
boundaries the vector’s allocation resides on), and filter each class only by the vital
dimensions: those with a higher value than the minimal. For vectors with only one vital
dimension, we use simultaneous 1-d binary searches, for those with two we use a single
2-d tree and, for those with more, we use simultaneous 2-d trees. This reduces both the
construction time and the query time, as the trees are smaller and each is filtered only
by vital dimensions.
4 Correctness Proof
We prove that our algorithm produces correct results, i.e., an allocation that maximizes
the social welfare.
4.1 Notations
We use the notations from Table 1. Let P = {i}ni=1 denote the set of all agents. We
define an allocation for any subset of agents G ⊆ P and for maximal quantities of
allocatable goods m as follows:
AmG = {ai}i∈G. (12)
We denote agent i’s valuation for an allocation AmG as
Vi(A
m
G ) =
{
Vi(A
m
G [i]), if i ∈ G
0, otherwise,
(13)
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where AmG [i] is the allocation of agent i.
For any subset H ⊆ G ⊆ P under the allocation AmG , we denote by VH(AmG ) the
aggregated valuation of the agents in H under this allocation, by SH(AmG ) the sum
of resources allocated to the agents in H under this allocation (element wise), and by
EH(A
m
G ) the subset of allocations of the agents in H under this allocation. Formally,
VH(A
m
G ) = Σi∈H(Vi(A
m
G )) (14)
SH(A
m
G ) = Σi∈H(ai) (15)
EH(A
m
G ) = {ai}i∈H (16)
The social welfare of an allocation is defined as the aggregated sum of all the agents’
valuations for that allocation, i.e., SW(AmP ) = VP (A
m
P ).
An allocation AmG is valid if S(A
m
G ) ≤ m. A valid allocation AmG is optimal if it
maximizes the aggregated valuation:
∀BmG : VG(BmG ) ≤ VG(AmG ), (17)
where BmG is a valid allocation.
4.2 Supporting Lemma
In this subsection we will prove Lemma 1, which supports the use of the additive pro-
cess of joining the valuations one by one. Following (Section 4.3) is a proof by induction
that uses Lemma 1 to prove the optimality of the results.
Lemma 1 For any optimal allocation AˆmP and any subset of agents G ⊆ P , the allo-
cations of the agents in G are also optimal for the case where the agents in G are the
only agents and the number of allocatable units is exactly the sum of their allocations.
That is, VG(AˆmP ) = VG(Aˆ
mG
G ), where mG = SG(Aˆ
m
P ).
Proof. Assume the claim is false. Then, there exists an optimal allocation AˆmP and a
subset G ⊆ P , such that the allocations of the agents in G are not optimal for the case
where these agents are the only agents and the number of allocatable units is exactly
the sum of their allocations. That is, VG(AˆmP ) 6= VG(AˆmGG ), where mG = SG(AˆmP ).
There are two cases:
Case 1 (VG(AˆmP ) < VG(Aˆ
mG
G )). Combine Aˆ
m
P and Aˆ
mG
G to create a new allocation
A˜ such that the agents in G get the resources they get under AˆmGG , and the rest of the
agents get the resources they get under AˆmP . The new allocation A˜ is valid because
AˆmGG is valid, and SG(Aˆ
m
P ) = mG ≥ SG(AˆmGG ), so SP (A˜) ≤ m. According to the
assumption,
VG(Aˆ
m
P ) < VG(Aˆ
mG
G ), (18)
and thus
VP (Aˆ
m
P ) = VG(Aˆ
m
P ) + VP\G(Aˆ
m
P ), (19)
which according to (18) is smaller than
VP (Aˆ
mG
G ) + VP\G(Aˆ
m
P ) = V (A˜), (20)
in contradiction to the optimality of allocation AˆmP .
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Case 2 (VG(AˆmP ) > V (Aˆ
mG
G )). Since SG(Aˆ
m
P ) = mG, then EG(Aˆ
m
P ) is a valid
allocation for the subset of agents G with maximal allocatable resources of mG, and
it yields a higher aggregated value than AˆmGG , in contradiction to the optimality of the
allocation AˆmGG .
4.3 Proof by Induction
Our algorithm joins valuations into an accumulated valuation one by one. At each step,
for each number of resources m, the algorithm iterates over all possible combination
of resources mi,mj such that mi + mj ≤ m. Then, for each m, the algorithm
chooses the mi,mj that yielded the maximal aggregated value. Finally, we choose m
that yields the maximal value in the final joint valuation function.
We prove by induction that the above algorithm finds an optimal allocation. For
generality, we do not assume that the joining of the valuations is done in any particular
order. Instead, at each step, any two valuation functions might be joined to form a single
effective one.
Theorem 2 For a subset of agents G and allocatable quantities m of goods, the algo-
rithm finds an optimal allocation AˆmG .
Proof. Case 3 (|G| = 1). For one agent, no joining of two valuations is needed. The
algorithm simply chooses the maximal valuation for any allocation up to m. This is the
maximum social welfare by definition.
Case 4 (Inductive hypothesis). Suppose the theorem holds when |G| ≤ k, for some
k ≥ 1. Let |G| = k + 1.
Consider any two non-empty, disjoint subsets: X and Y , where X ∪Y = G. By the
pigeonhole principle, |X| ≤ k and |Y | ≤ k, and
SG(Aˆ
m
G ) = SX(Aˆ
m
G ) + SY (Aˆ
m
G ) ≤m (21)
since the optimality of allocation AˆmG implies it is valid.
Let us denote mX = SX(AˆmG ), mY = SY (Aˆ
m
G ). Then
mX +mY ≤m. (22)
According to Lemma 1,
VX(Aˆ
m
G ) = VX(Aˆ
mX
X ) (23)
VY (Aˆ
m
G ) = VY (Aˆ
mY
Y ) (24)
=⇒ VX(AˆmXX ) + VY (AˆmYY ) = VG(AˆmG ).
Hence, since we search all the options where mX +mY ≤ m and find optimal
allocations AˆmXX , Aˆ
mY
Y for each of them, we must encounter an allocation with the
above aggregated valuation. Because it is the maximal value, our algorithm will prefer
this allocation to the alternatives. So, the theorem holds for |G| = k + 1.
By induction, the theorem holds for every size of G.
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5 Complexity Analysis of Joining Two Valuations
We first show the worst-case time complexity of O(N2), which may be relevant only in
unrealistic scenarios. Then, we analyze the worst-case complexity of a single resource
over realistic valuation functions, and find it equal O(N logN). Finally, we show that
multiple resources yield the same time complexity, but on average over all possible
realistic valuation functions.
5.1 Worst Case
The worst case complexity of joining two valuation functions isO(N2), when for every
query, the number of matching allocations is proportionate to N . This can happen, for
example, when both valuation functions are linear, with an identical slope. Any of the
N queries on one of the functions will return every allocation (O(N)), as the upper-
bound limit is inclusive. This adversarial example, however, is unlikely on a real cloud,
with a mixture of clients and valuation functions, and where precise linear scaling is
rare. We will thus consider in the following only strictly convex/concave functions, i.e.,
without any precise linear parts.
5.2 Single Resource
To analyze the complexity we will assume N → ∞, which approximates a smooth
continuous function were the left partial derivative is equal to the right. This reduces
the local optimum property to a single rule: for an optimal allocation, all the agents’
valuation functions have identical identical gradients.
For a single resource with concave/convex valuation functions, each derivative value
is obtained at most once. Hence, each query will match at most one allocation. For a
function with one or more inflection points, each query will match a number of allo-
cations up to the number of inflection points in the function. The number of inflection
points is related to the number of hierarchies in the resource. For example, a CPU might
have two inflection points: when switching from a single-core to multiple-cores, and
then to multiple-chips. Memory might also have two inflection points when switching
between cache, RAM and storage. Five inflection points, however, might be considered
unrealistically high for computing resource valuation functions. Thus, we consider the
number of possible inflection points for each resource to be a constant as it is inde-
pendent on the parameters (n, N and R) and is generally small. This yields a maximal
complexity of O(N).
The time complexity of joining two valuation functions is at least O(N logN), the
data structure construction complexity. Hence, the complexity of joining two valuation
functions is O(N logN).
5.3 Multiple Resources
Similarly to a single resource, for multiple resources with concave/convex valuation
functions, each gradient vector is obtained at most once. We can consider each resource
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to have inflection points independently of the other resources, e.g., it is possible to
switch from a single processor to a multi-processor algorithm regardless of the RAM
usage. Thus, if each resource has t inflection points, we can divide the valuation func-
tion domain into (t+1)R sections, each being convex or concave. That is, each gradient
vector might be obtained at most once in each of these sections. The actual number of
matches is much lower than (t+ 1)R, and is constant as shown in Section 7.2.
We reconcile these differences by showing that the average case, over all possible
realistic valuation functions yields a constant number of matching allocations. To do
this, we will assume without loss of generality that the partial derivatives on each of
the inflection points and in the function boundaries distribute uniformly from zero to
the maximal derivative. The partial derivatives of the required gradient will also dis-
tribute uniformly with the same boundaries. Then, for exactly two inflection points per
resource, we will have three sections, each with different uniformly distributed bound-
aries. The probability of a single derivative that is uniformly distributed to be in these
boundaries is 13 , and thus, for each resource, exactly one section is expected to have this
gradient. Thus, regardless of the number of resourcesR, exactly one section is expected
to have the required gradient (out of the total (t + 1)R). Since only a single matching
allocation exists in that section, the expected number of matching allocations is exactly
one.
Furthermore, if we assume that the required gradient has different derivative bound-
aries, as we would expect in the real world, then a higher number of inflection points
will yield a single matching section as well. If the first client’s valuation function has a
maximal derivative d times higher than the second, then b3 ·d−1c number of inflection
points per resource will yield at most one matching allocation per query. Since the joint
valuation function is expected to have higher derivatives with each joining, we would
expect d to grow in each step, and thus reduce the number of matching allocations. This
yields an average complexity of O(N) over realistic valuation functions.
Hence, similarly to a single resource, the complexity of joining two multi-resource
valuation functions is O(N logN).
6 Evaluation
Here we empirically evaluate the algorithm’s complexity, and verify that our implemen-
tation is efficient enough to be applicable in a real system.
6.1 Implementation Details
We implemented the joint function algorithm and Maille´ and Tuffin’s [41] algorithm in
C++ and Python. The code is available as open source3.
The joining of two valuation functions and the upper-bound data structures were
implemented in C++. The algorithm can accept any upper-bound data structure as a
template parameter. We implemented the naı¨ve joining in C++ as well. Both imple-
mentations accept two R-dimensional tensors, which represent the clients’ valuation
3 Available from: https://bitbucket.org/funaro/vecfunc-vcg.
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functions (or effective joint valuation functions), and return an R-dimensional tensor,
which is the joint valuation function. The C++ library is called (via a Python wrap-
per) to join the functions one by one, and the allocation and payment calculations are
implemented in Python.
Our C++ implementation of Maille´ and Tuffin’s [41] algorithm accepts all the clients’
bids and returns the optimal allocation. This C++ implementation is called once (via a
Python wrapper) to compute the optimal allocations, and then again for each winning
client to compute the payments.
6.2 Benchmark Dataset
We considered three different types of datasets: concave, increasing, and mostly-increasing.
We produced 10 datasets of each type, each with 256 clients that participate in the VCG
auction. The concave datasets contain concave, strictly increasing valuation functions.
These datasets are used to compare our results to Maille´ and Tuffin’s method, where
the types of valuation functions are very restricted [41]. The increasing datasets include
weakly increasing valuation functions that might not be concave. This is our main test
case as real-life valuation functions may have multiple inflection points [11, 20, 39,
56, 60, 62]. Valuation functions, however, are not expected to decrease when more re-
sources are offered, if these resources can be freely discarded. The mostly-increasing
datasets include valuation functions with multiple maximum points (non-monotonic).
Such functions will increase for a large part of their input, but may occasionally de-
crease. They are realistic when the hindering resources are not disposed of, as is the
case, for example, when allocating more RAM lengthens garbage collection time and
performance drops [3, 59]. We use these datasets to show that our algorithm performs
well even with non-monotonic functions. We did not test strictly convex valuation func-
tions as they are not realistic.
For each client, we produced an R-dimensional valuation function (Vi : [0, 1]R ∈
RR 7→ [0,∞) ∈ R), which it uses as its bid. We generated R intermediate single-
dimensional functions (vri : [0, 1] ∈ R 7→ [0, 1] ∈ R) without loss of generality, where
an input value of 1 represents the entire available resource r, and an output of 1 repre-
sents the client’s maximal valuation of the resource.
To compute a client’s valuation function—i.e., its bid for each bundle of units—for
each single-dimensional function, we sampled a vector sized according to the number of
available units for each resource and computed the vectors’ tensor product: Vi = v1i ⊗
... ⊗ vRi . This yielded an R-dimensional tensor with values in the range of [0, 1] ∈ R.
To produce a valuation function of fewer than R dimensions (0 < r < R), we used the
same dataset but only with the first r intermediate single-dimensional functions.
We modeled the clients’ maximal valuations using data from Azure’s public dataset [15],
which includes information on Azure’s cloud clients, such as the bundle rented by each
client. Assuming the client is rational, the cost of the bundle is a lower bound on the
client’s valuation of this bundle. We modeled the clients’ expected revenue using a
Pareto distribution (standard in economics) with an index of 1.1. A Pareto distribution
with this parameter translates to the 80-20 rule: 20% of the population has 80% of the
valuation, which is reasonable for income distributions [54].
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(b) Runtime of a full auction and payment
calculation for 256 clients.
Fig. 2: The performance of our algorithm in each of our datasets (concave, increasing
and mostly-increasing).
For each client, we drew a value from this Pareto distribution, with the condition that
the value is higher than the client’s bundle cost (i.e., a conditional probability distribu-
tion). We then multiplied each client’s R-dimensional tensor with the maximal value
drawn from the Pareto distribution, to produce the client’s valuation function.
6.3 Experimental Setup
We evaluated our algorithm on a machine with 16GB of RAM and two Intel(R) Xeon(R)
E5-2420 CPUs @ 1.90GHz with 15MB LLC. Each CPU had six cores with hyper-
threading enabled, for a total of 24 hardware threads. The host ran Linux with kernel
4.8.0-58-generic #63~16.04.1-Ubuntu. To reduce measurement noise, we tested using
a single core, leaving the rest idle.
7 Results
The combination of data structures was chosen for the purpose of the evaluation as it
performed the best. This is shown in the data structure comparison in Section 7.3.
Our algorithm scales linearly to the number of possible allocations (N ), for any
number of resources, as depicted in Figure 2. Although the performance differences
between the concave, increasing and mostly-increasing datasets were insignificant, we
can see that our algorithm performs better on the mostly-increasing dataset. This is be-
cause more allocations were eliminated in the preprocessing phase due to their negative
left partial derivative. This preprocessing was included in the algorithm’s runtime.
Adding resources results in larger vectors and thus higher complexity; at the same
time, more vectors are eliminated in the preprocessing phase. This is why we see an
increase in runtime for up to four resources, after which the performance begins to
improve.
Figure 2b shows that the multi-resource auction is feasible even in the worst case:
for concave/increasing valuation functions, and for three and four resources with 256
clients, a full auction takes less than two minutes for over 60,000 possible allocations.
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7.1 Naı¨ve Joining of Valuation Functions
The results show (Figure 3) that the performance of the naı¨ve approach for joining two
valuation functions fits the expected curve, as shown in Section 3.3, for any number of
resources. Figure 3 depicts the performance for the increasing dataset. The naı¨ve joining
is not affected by valuation function properties such as monotonicity. The complexity
function, described in Section 3.3, passes through all the markers, i.e., fits the actual
performance perfectly. Each line, however, had to be scaled by a different factor to fit
the markers. This might be an effect of the cache prefetching combined with the C-style
multidimensional array representation. The naı¨ve joining compares each allocation ai
to all allocations aj s.t. aj ≤ m − ai. For multidimensional valuation functions that
are represented as C arrays, we will read the array non-continuously when ai > 0. This
will reduce the effectiveness of the cache prefetching as it relies on the continuity of the
reading.
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Fig. 3: The performance of the naı¨ve approach for joining two valuation functions.
Markers depict the performance with different numbers of resources. The lines are the
complexity function described in Section 3.3, scaled to fit the markers.
7.2 Ideal Case Analysis
We ran another set of experiments on each dataset, where we counted, in each joining
of two valuation functions, the number of allocations that matched the queries of the
one valuation function, for each allocation of the other. Figure 4 shows the results. The
number of matching allocations converges to a constant number. Thus, were we to have
an ideal data structure that does not return false positives and with reasonable query and
construction time, the complexity of joining two valuation functions would be O(N).
7.3 Data Structure Analysis
We timed each step of the algorithm: creating the data structure, performing the query
and fetching the allocations. The results are shown in Figure 5.
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number of resources.
Simultaneous 1-d binary searches have the fastest construction, but their false-
positive ratio grows quickly with N , as indicated by the longer fetching time. Hence
they are not scalable.
Simultaneous 2-d binary search trees performed similarly to the combination of
trees. The construction time of the latter is better as some trees contain fewer vectors.
We, therefore, recommend this solution.
In all the tested cases and for all the data structures, the construction time is more
than 30% of the total runtime, and over 70% of the total runtime in some cases. Further
improvement could be obtained by finding a data structure with a smaller construction
time. If we consider simultaneous 1-d binary searches as a lower bound on the con-
struction time—an upper-bound data structure must at least sort the vectors by each
dimension—then improving the construction time will improve the algorithm by 10%-
20% at most.
For similar reasons, the query time could not be lower than for 1-d binary searches,
which is nearly identical to the combination of data structures. Hence, no further im-
provement in the query time is expected.
The fetching time is 10%-25% of the total time for the combination of data struc-
tures. Reducing the number of false positives may reduce this phase’s time. Thus,
any improvement of the algorithm by increasing the accuracy of the data structures
is bounded by 10%-25%.
Fetching the allocations includes an additional filtering (one by one) to remove
all the false positives. Thus, the performance of the final step—i.e., comparing the
allocations—is independent of the data structure. From the above, we conclude that
any speedup of the algorithm via an improved data structure is limited by 20%-50%.
7.4 False Positives
We measured the ratio of false positive results when applying our algorithm on all the
datasets (Figure 6). For any of the resources, the false-positive ratio grows linearly
with the number of possible allocations. Using an ideal data structure could reduce the
number of false positives by up to a factor of 60. Nonetheless, such an improvement
could only speed up the optimization by 10%-25%, as shown in Section 7.3.
Efficient Multi-Resource, Multi-Unit VCG Auction 19
0
3e-4
5e-4
8e-4
R = 1
0
5e-4
1e-3
2e-3
R = 2
0
5e-4
1e-3
2e-3
R = 3
0
5e-4
1e-3
R = 4
0
3e-4
5e-4
8e-4
R = 5
0
2e-4
4e-4
R = 6
N
=
97
2
0
0.02
0.04
Build Query Fetch Compare
0
0.025
0.05
0.075
0
0.05
0.1
0
0.05
0.1
0
0.05
0.1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
N
=
34
37
5
D
S
-2
D
S
-3
D
S
-4
0
0.05
0.1
D
S
-2
D
S
-3
D
S
-4
0
0.1
0.2
D
S
-2
D
S
-3
D
S
-4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
D
S
-2
D
S
-3
D
S
-4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
D
S
-2
D
S
-3
D
S
-4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
D
S
-2
D
S
-3
D
S
-4
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
N
=
62
20
8
S
in
gl
e
jo
in
ti
m
e
(s
ec
on
d
s)
DS-2: Simultaneous 1-d Binary Searches, DS-3: Simultaneous 2-d Trees, DS-4: Combination
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7.5 Separate Single-Resource Auction
We compared our multi-resource VCG auction implementation to the alternative of
performing an auction for each resource separately. We used Maille´ and Tuffin’s method
for a single-resource auction with the concave valuation functions dataset. For each
resource r, each client bid its intermediate single-dimensional valuation functions vri
(see Section 6.2). Each client’s maximal valuation was treated as a budget, which was
partitioned equally among its valuation functions for each resource. For example, for
two resources, a client with a maximal valuation of 10 would have a maximal valuation
of 5 for each of its resources.
Such an approach reduces the social welfare by over 60% on average compared
to the optimum for two resources (Figure 7). When more resources are auctioned, the
social welfare decreases even further.
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7.6 Verification
To verify our implementation, we compared our algorithm’s results with those of Maille´
and Tuffin [41] using the concave dataset and a single resource. For all the tested num-
bers of units (N ), our algorithm produced the same allocation and payments as Maille´
and Tuffin’s method.
We also compared our algorithm’s results for two and more resources to those of
the naı¨ve implementation. For all the tested numbers of units (N ) and resources (R),
our algorithm produced identical results to the naı¨ve implementation.
8 Related Work
The Resource-as-a-Service (RaaS) cloud [1] is a vertically elastic cloud model that
allows providers to rent adjustable quantities of individual resources for short time
intervals—even at a sub-second granularity. It deploys economic mechanisms to al-
locate the resources quickly and efficiently. The RaaS model was implemented in Gin-
seng: first, to allocate resources for RAM [3] using a VCG-like auction mechanism, and
later for last-level-cache [19] using a full VCG auction.
Many solutions were suggested for allocating multiple resources in the cloud. Non-
economic solutions may optimize fairness according to clients’ requirements [16,23,28,
31, 53] or consider the clients as a black box and use host measurements instead [57].
Hadi et al. [26] aim to maximize the profit of the providers by meeting client’s SLA.
Some achieve truthfulness under restrictive conditions on the types of clients allowed to
participate in the auction [3,9,38,41,45], or by restrictions on the bidding language [10,
17, 32, 58]. Other solutions offer only near-optimal auction results [8, 18, 46, 51, 61].
9 Conclusions and Future Work
We introduced a new efficient algorithm to allocate multiple divisible resources via a
VCG auction, without any restrictions on the valuation functions. We proved the al-
gorithm’s correctness, verified it experimentally, and showed its efficiency on a large
number of resources and its scalability when increasing the number of units per re-
source.
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We analyzed how the different properties of the valuation functions affect the algo-
rithm’s performance. We showed that using only concave valuation functions negligibly
decreases the complexity compared to increasing valuation functions, and that mostly-
increasing ones perform the best.
We combined data structures, tailoring them to our input data to create a data struc-
ture that produces fewer false positives and has faster construction time. We analyzed
different data structures and showed a potential speedup of up to 2×. Finding a better
upper-bound data structure is left for future work.
Our algorithm allows cloud providers to implement the RaaS [1] model. They can
deploy a multi-resource auction for allocation of additional resources in an existing VM
every two minutes for up to 256 clients in a single physical machine. Our implementa-
tion can be adapted simply to use succinct valuation functions that are only defined on
a small subset of the allocations. This will eliminate the exponential factor of N in R,
the number of resources, which may greatly improve the performance and might allow
a sub-second auction granularity for a large number of clients. A succinct implemen-
tation might also support continuous valuation functions with good performance but
unbounded complexity. Adapting the implementation for continuous succinct valuation
functions is left for future work.
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